A comparison of France’s 2026 professional sport reforms and the English football regulator’s response to the Manchester City case.
Recent events in France and England show two very different approaches to state involvement in sport. France has chosen direct legislation. Act No. 2026-725 of 3 August 2026 changes how professional sport is organised, governed and financed. It also amends the Sports Code to protect participants, strengthen integrity and clarify public interest duties.
England, by contrast, has created an independent statutory regulator for men’s professional football. Its challenge is to keep government away from individual decisions. That issue came into focus when David Kogan, Chair of the Independent Football Regulator (IFR), said he would resign if political pressure were applied to any future action involving Manchester City.
This is not simply a choice between intervention and non-intervention. Both countries accept that sport cannot be left entirely to federations and leagues. The real difference is how each system is designed. France uses legislation to set standards across professional sport. England uses legislation to create an arm’s-length regulator whose credibility depends on freedom from ministerial influence. One model protects athletes and competitions by defining required outcomes. The other protects football by safeguarding the decision-making process.
1. France: the state sets the standards
France has a long tradition of treating sport as a matter of public interest, with federations carrying out delegated public functions. The 2026 law builds on that tradition, by increasing control over the people and bodies that shape athletes’ careers.
Officials may be disqualified after specified convictions; pay for federation officials is restricted; foreign funding of candidates in federation elections is banned; and sporting bodies face wider transparency duties. These are more than internal governance choices. They are legal safeguards intended to reduce conflicts of interest and make institutions answerable for athletes’ working environments.
The changes to sports agents are particularly important for athlete protection. The law replaces the traditional licence with a professional card. It also requires ongoing training, strengthens anti-money-laundering and ethics education, makes pay more transparent, and keeps a cap on commission.
Criminal penalties for unlawful agency work are increased, and intermediaries and companies face tighter operating rules. Together, these measures aim to correct the imbalance between athletes — who may be young, influential and reliant on expert advice — and the intermediaries who control access to contracts, transfers, and sponsorship.
The law also uses public powers to promote structural equality. Women’s sport is no longer treated only as a policy goal. The legislation supports financial solidarity, stronger organisation of women’s competitions, and greater visibility. Here, athlete protection means more than preventing abuse. It also means improving economic opportunity, representation and access to sustainable competitions. The state is not only responding to misconduct; it is reshaping the market in which sporting careers develop.
2. England: intervention through an independent regulator
England’s intervention is narrower, but constitutionally sensitive. The IFR oversees the financial sustainability and integrity of men’s professional football. Its role includes assessing whether owners, directors, and senior executives are suitable. After an independent commission made findings against Manchester City, the regulator said it could consider league findings and use its statutory suitability powers where appropriate. It also stressed that the club’s appeal was still unresolved. In an extreme case, future action could lead to an owner being disqualified or forced to sell.
The political sensitivity is clear. Manchester City’s ownership connects the case with wider UK–UAE diplomatic and commercial interests. Public concern about the possible departure of the club’s Abu Dhabi owners therefore created a perception — justified or not — that football regulation could conflict with foreign policy priorities.
Kogan responded firmly. He said the IFR had faced no political pressure, but that he would resign if any were applied. His position was not opposition to statutory regulation; it was a defence of it. Parliament created the regulator to apply legal criteria independently. Ministerial influence in a live case would undermine that design.
The legislative history supports this view. An earlier proposal would have required the regulator to consider the Government’s foreign and trade policy when assessing suitability, but that requirement was removed. The change shows an intention to keep club regulation separate from the executive’s diplomatic priorities. Independence is therefore part of the statutory framework, not just a convention that depends on the Chair’s resolve.
Even so, the episode exposes a weakness. The regulator may still rely on government for appointments, resources and, in exceptional litigation, extra funding. Genuine independence requires transparent appointments, secure budgets and well-reasoned decisions that can withstand judicial scrutiny.
3. Two models, one question of legitimacy
France’s model is broad and democratically visible. Parliament can identify vulnerable relationships, set minimum standards and impose sanctions. This is especially valuable when athletes cannot realistically negotiate protection for themselves.
The risk is too much prescription. Detailed rules may become inflexible, create heavy compliance burdens or draw political priorities too far into sporting governance. The model’s legitimacy depends on clear, proportionate and enforceable rules — not simply on having more regulation.
England’s model allows specialist, case-specific decisions at arm’s length from ministers. Its main promise is procedural: decisions should be based on evidence, applied consistently and protected from short-term political or diplomatic interests.
But independence must not mean a lack of accountability. The IFR must explain how its owner-suitability rules fit with league sanctions, appeal rights and proportionality. Although independent of government, it must remain accountable to Parliament, the courts and the regulated community through transparent procedures.
Despite their differences, both countries reject the idea that sporting bodies should be autonomous simply because they govern sport. In France, autonomy is limited by legal duties on integrity, equality, and the treatment of athletes. In England, football’s private rules are backed by a public regulator, while that regulator is protected from government direction. The state intervenes in both systems; the difference is where each system draws the legal boundary.
4. What the Manchester City case may reveal
The Manchester City matter may provide the first major test of England’s new system. The issue is not only what powers the IFR has, but whether it can use them fairly and without political influence. France faces a similar practical test: whether its ambitious legal protections produce stronger institutions and better outcomes for athletes.
For sports lawyers, “state intervention” is too broad a label. The better questions may be: who benefits, which institution acts, what safeguards apply and who holds that institution accountable?
France’s answer is to protect people through detailed legislation. England’s answer is to use independent administration within a statutory framework. Both systems claim to defend sporting integrity. Each will ultimately be judged on whether it protects participants and competitions when commercial and political pressures are at their strongest.
Céline Jones is a Partner in our commercial disputes team. Céline has over 20 years’ experience in cross-border litigation.... Read More
